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ABSTRACT
We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to
identify an exogenous change in the after-tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher
stock ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation
is found in previous periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms
that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to
the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated,
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Shareholder payouts have changed dramatically over the past two decades, with dividend payout 
ratios falling substantially and share repurchases increasing rapidly (Fama and French (2001), 
Grullon and Michaely (2002)).  Following the dividend tax cut in the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of May 2003, however, dividend activity increased sharply, 
particularly the number of dividend initiations (e.g., Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2004), 
Chetty and Saez (2005)).
1  The dividend tax cut represented a large increase in the after-tax 
value of dividends to individual investors, as the top marginal tax rate on dividends was cut over 
20 percentage points, from 38.6% to 15%.
2  This tax change moved from initial proposal to 
signed law in under five months, and was thus largely unanticipated prior to 2003.  Because this 
tax cut is an exogenous increase in the after-tax value of dividends to individual investors, it 
represents a unique laboratory for using actual firm behavior to determine the role of taxes and 
other factors that affect dividend policy. 
  We use this dividend tax change to answer three questions.  First, what determines how 
firms responded to the dividend tax cut?  In particular, can executive stock holdings explain the 
cross-sectional pattern of dividend increases?  Second, do the dividend increases raise total firm 
payouts, or are they partially offset by reduced share repurchases?  Third, by examining share 
price reactions around key events leading to the tax cut, are we able to shed light on whether 
these payout policy decisions reflect possible agency problems within firms? 
Why might executive stock holdings influence the firm’s reaction to the dividend tax cut?  
The 2003 dividend tax cut raised the after-tax value of a $1 dividend to high-income 
shareholders from 61.4 cents to 85 cents, a 38% increase.  Thus, the cost of initiating or 
increasing dividend payments for executives who have large direct stock ownership decreased 
substantially in 2003.  Moreover, executives who are under-diversified with large company stock 
ownership may place additional value on dividends for liquidity reasons, stemming from the fact 
that they may face explicit/contractual restrictions (e.g., Core and Guay (1999)) or implicit 
  1restrictions (e.g., insider sales may be viewed as a negative signal by the market) on their ability 
to sell shares of stock.
3   
In contrast, firms whose executives are compensated primarily in the form of cash or 
stock options would have no such incentives.  Because employee stock options are rarely 
dividend-protected (Murphy (1999)), executives compensated with options have a personal 
financial incentive to limit dividends because they face a 100% implicit “tax” rate on dividends, 
both before and after the dividend tax cut.  That is, executive options fall in value with the 
decline in the share price that would result from a cash dividend which is not offset by the receipt 
of the dividend to option holders.  Thus, while an executive who holds a large share of their 
wealth in options would have a personal financial incentive to keep dividend payments low, this 
is true both before and after the dividend tax cut.   Indeed, several prior studies have found that 
when managers have more of their wealth in the form of options, rather than direct shares, they 
tend to use dividends less heavily (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989), Jolls (1998), Weisbenner 
(2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002)). 
These prior studies, however, did not have any exogenous shift in the relative cost of 
distributing cash through dividends or repurchases.  Because of this lack of exogenous variation, 
the previous literature is subject to the criticism that the cross-sectional correlation between 
executive compensation and payout policy may reflect unobservable characteristics, such as 
managerial quality or corporate governance, that generate both compensation policy and 
dividend policy.  A key contribution of our study is that we use the unexpected and exogenous 
shift in the relative cost of paying dividends that arises from the tax change to address these 
criticisms and thus provide stronger econometric identification of the relations of interest. 
More recently, in work conducted simultaneously with ours, other authors have also 
investigated the effect of the 2003 tax cut on firm payout behavior.  While Chetty and Saez 
(2005) and Nam, Wang and Zhang (2004) are focused primarily on establishing a causal link 
between the tax cut and increased dividend activity, they do provide some cross-sectional 
evidence that dividend increases are positively related to share ownership by managers.
4  Blouin, 
  2Raedy and Shackelford (2004) also report that dividend increases are positively related to insider 
ownership.  Our study differs from these studies in several ways.  First, our primary focus is on 
using the tax cut as a source of exogenous variation in the tax cost of executive ownership as a 
way of more definitively testing whether executive ownership influences payout decisions.  
Second, we test whether the dividend tax cut resulted in an increase in total firm payouts, or 
instead represented a substitution between payout mechanisms for some firms.  Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) find that some of the increase in share repurchases over the past decade has 
come at the expense of a reduction (or lack of increase) in dividends.  We provide what we 
believe is the first test of whether this pattern occurs in reverse, i.e., whether in response to the 
2003 dividend tax cut, an increase in dividends is accompanied by a decrease in share 
repurchases.  Third, we examine whether excess stock returns around key legislative events 
pertaining to the tax cut reflect potential agency costs.  Specifically, we are interested in whether 
stock prices reacted to the possible agency conflict between executives’ incentives to raise 
dividends when their personal ownership stakes are higher and the fact that the overall tax 
burden for other individual shareholders may have actually risen if dividends were substituted 
for share repurchases (which ought to still be preferred due to their lower effective tax rate).
5     
We have three principal findings.  First, we provide evidence that executive stock 
holdings are an important explanation of which firms chose to respond to the tax cut by 
increasing dividends.  We show that the substantial variation across firms in the fraction of 
shares held by top executives can explain approximately one-quarter of the total unexpected 
increase in dividends after the May 2003 tax cut, and an even larger share (roughly one-half) of 
dividend initiations.  In further support of this effect, we find that while there is virtually no 
relation between executive stock ownership and the likelihood of a dividend increase in the 
decade before the tax cut (when the dividend tax rate, and hence the cost to the stock-owning 
executive of paying out dividends, was much higher), not only is the relation quite strong in 2003, 
but it is disproportionately concentrated after the passage of the act in late May of that year when 
the tax cost of paying dividends is substantially reduced.  While other factors, such as executive 
  3stock option holdings, firm cash flow, leverage, past firm performance, and institutional 
ownership are important determinants of dividend policy in general, only the effect of executive 
stock holdings substantially changed with the change in tax regime, which is supportive of a tax 
effect.  These results are quite robust to additional controls and to alternative specifications.     
Our second finding is that, despite the increase in dividends in response to the tax cut, 
about one-third of firms that initiated dividends in 2003 scaled back repurchases by an amount 
sufficient to reduce total payouts (dividends plus share repurchases). This is in sharp contrast to 
prior years, when approximately 10% of dividend initiators reduced total payouts in the year of 
initiation.  Our results further suggest that while the firms with more executive stock holdings are 
more likely to increase dividends, they are no more likely to increase total payouts.  This 
suggests that, among those firms for which executive ownership had a large effect on dividend 
initiations, there is some degree of dividend-repurchase substitution occurring.  Thus, while 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) found that firms with lower-than-expected dividend yields had 
larger repurchase programs in the 1990s, we find that many of the firms that initiated dividends 
in response to the 2003 tax cut were likely to at the same time reduce share repurchases, 
suggesting that payout substitution may work in both directions.  
Finally, we explore potential agency problems by examining how the market responded 
to news of the 2003 tax cut.  To the extent that there is some substitution occurring between 
dividends and share repurchases, this suggests that the dividend tax cut may have actually 
increased the overall tax burden for the typical individual shareholder as capital gains are likely 
still tax advantaged relative to dividends even after the tax cut.  We find that the firms which 
historically have paid large dividends and which have a large fraction of individual shareholders 
experienced stock price gains in response to the proposal and passage of the tax cut.  However, 
the market appears to have at least partially anticipated that some firms, in particular those firms 
whose executives had large stock holdings, would substitute dividends for tax-advantaged share 
repurchases or the retention of earnings, and thus potentially raise the tax burden on total 
distributions for individual shareholders.     
  4This paper proceeds as follows.  In section I, we discuss our sample, summary statistics 
of the data, and provide more background on the 2003 dividend tax cut.  In section II, we present 
our results on the effect of executive share ownership on dividend increases, and test how the 
relation between executive holdings and dividend policy has changed over the pre- and post-tax-
change regimes.  In section III, we examine whether firms who increase dividends are increasing 
total payouts, or are just substituting dividends for share repurchases, leaving total payouts 
unchanged.  In section IV, we analyze the market response to news of the tax cut to determine 
whether the market anticipated for which firms the tax cut would lead to dividend substitution.  
Section V concludes.   
 
I.  Sample, Summary Statistics, and the 2003 Tax Cut 
We begin with approximately 1,700 publicly traded firms in each year from 1993 to 2003 
for which we are able to merge the necessary firm characteristic, stock, and executive 
compensation data from Compustat, CRSP and Execucomp.
6  These firms together comprise the 
vast majority of total U.S. stock market capitalization.  In addition to share ownership and 
options outstanding held by the top five executives, as provided by Execucomp, we are also 
interested in shares and options held by others.  Because institutional investors may face 
different tax rates from managers and may serve as important monitors of firm activity, we 
collect data on institutional ownership from CDA Spectrum, including a split between mutual 
funds and other institutions.  We also hand collect data from company 10-k filings on options 
held by employees who are not among the top executive ranks.  Specifically, we define options 
held by non-executive employees to be the difference between total and top executive holdings.   
Table I reports summary statistics for our sample in 2002 and 2003.  We focus on 
ordinary dividend increases in 2003 and contrast them with those in earlier years.  As we discuss 
below, our analysis is robust to the inclusion of special dividends.  We use CRSP data so that we 
can accurately measure whether the dividend announcement date was before or after the passage 
of the tax cut in May 2003.  We code a firm as having increased dividends if, at any time during 
  5the period in question, the firm announced a dividend that was higher than the level of dividends 
they paid previously.  Specifically, an increase in dividends is defined as an increase in dividends 
per share (adjusted for stock splits).  We also make use of the Compustat definition of dividends 
to confirm dividend initiations among firms that previously did not pay dividends. 
[Insert table I here] 
In 2003, 28.7% of the entire sample increased dividends, which is substantially larger 
than the fraction of dividend increasers in 2002 (which was 22.0%) and in other recent years.  
Particularly striking is the frequency of dividend initiations: 5.9% of previously non-dividend 
paying firms started paying dividends in 2003, compared to only 1.2% in 2002, and it is higher 
than for any other year since 1980.  
Because our primary question of interest is how the executive ownership of company 
stock influences firm dividend policy, we highlight executive stock and option holdings in table I.  
Consistent with prior literature, top executive ownership is 0.8% of firm shares at the median 
firm, and 3.8% on average.  While the fraction of total shares outstanding held by top executives 
is relatively small, this can represent substantial wealth for these individuals.  For example, at the 
median, the value of stock held by the top executives at the end of 2002 was almost $12 million, 
nearly four times the median annual cash salary and bonus for top executives of $3.3 million.  
Summary statistics for other variables are provided at the bottom of table I. 
 
II.  Empirical Results on Executive Ownership and Dividend Increases 
A.  Results: Dividend Increases for 2003 Relative to Prior Decade 
The May 2003 dividend tax cut represents an ideal experiment for several reasons.  First, 
it is the first time in 17 years that the market faced a substantial reduction in the tax cost of 
paying dividends.
7  Second, aside from the reduction in dividend taxes, the legislation was free 
of other major changes to the tax law that might confound empirical analysis of its effects.  Third, 
it came largely as a “surprise” to the market, thus enabling us to treat it as an exogenous event.  
Specifically, the May 2003 legislation, which was made retroactive to January 1, 2003, was 
  6completely unanticipated until the days leading up to President Bush’s speech to the Economic 
Club of Chicago in early January 2003.  The news leakage of this idea prior to this event was 
minimal, and fewer than five months elapsed from the time of this announcement until the 
legislation passed.
8  Therefore, it is virtually certain that firms did not adjust their compensation 
structure prior to 2003 in anticipation of a future dividend tax cut, and thus we can treat our 
measure of executive ownership (which is based on 2002 data) as pre-determined.  This allows 
us to identify the causal effect of executive holdings on changes in dividend policy in response to 
the tax cut. 
In table II, we begin by exploring the correlation between the likelihood of a dividend 
increase and the fraction of shares held by the top five executives of the company.
9  We also 
control for a rich set of covariates, including executive holdings of options, the firm’s market-to-
book ratio (a proxy for growth opportunities), free cash flow, cash on hand, leverage, past firm 
stock market performance, volatility, firm size, firm age (to control for the “maturity” effect 
posited by Julio and Ikenberry (2005)), and industry effects covering 14 broad groups.
10  These 
variables are as of year-end 2002, and are related to whether the firm increased ordinary 
dividends per share in 2003.  Columns 1 through 3 report the results from a linear probability 
model, whereas columns 4 through 6 report results for a Probit model.   
[Insert table II here] 
Our first principal finding is that the fraction of shares held by top five executives is a 
very important determinant of dividend policy.  As shown in column 1, the coefficient on the 
fraction of shares outstanding held by the top executives is positive and highly significant; the 
coefficient of 54 indicates that moving from the 25
th percentile (0.3%) to the 75
th percentile 
(3.2%) of the fraction of shares held by the top executives raises the probability of a dividend 
increase by 1.6 percentage points, from a baseline of 28.7%.
11  Further, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in executive ownership translates into a 4.2 percentage point higher likelihood of a 
dividend increase. 
  7If it is indeed the case that the relation between executive stock ownership and dividend 
activity is driven by the change in the tax cost of paying dividends, then such a relation should 
not appear in prior years when dividends were taxed at a considerably higher rate (the top 
personal rate was nearly 40% over the 1993 to 2002 period).  The next two columns, which 
report coefficients from a single regression, provide such a comparison.  In column 2, we report 
the coefficients on key covariates over the 1993 to 2002 period pooled, while column 3 reports 
the interaction of these covariates with a year 2003 indicator variable.
12  This approach allows us 
to easily test whether the effect of each covariate is different in 2003 than in prior years.   
Focusing again on shares held by top five executives, we immediately see that there is no 
correlation between executive share ownership and dividend increases in the prior decade, but a 
strong relation in 2003, with the difference in the executive ownership effect highly significant.  
This pattern is consistent with the view that the dividend tax cut reduced the cost of paying 
dividends and thus raised the probability of a dividend increase for those firms in which 
management had the most to gain, such as by obtaining liquidity through dividend payments.     
Before discussing other covariates, we also report, in columns 4 through 6, the marginal 
effects from a Probit specification.  The marginal effect of a change in the fraction of shares held 
by the top five executives is nearly identical to that from the linear probability model.
13
Turning to the many covariates that might plausibly explain firm payout behavior, we 
find a pattern that is quite consistent with our hypothesis.  Not surprisingly, most of these 
covariates have significant explanatory power in explaining cross-sectional differences in 
dividend policy.  Starting with the OLS results over the 1993 to 2002 period, the likelihood of 
increasing dividends is increasing with free cash flow, past five-year returns, and (log) market 
value of the firm.  It is decreasing in the number of options held by top executives, cash on hand, 
leverage, and monthly stock price volatility.
14
Perhaps most importantly for our hypothesis, the differences in the magnitude of these 
effects between 2003 and the earlier decade are all insignificant.  In other words, we cannot 
reject a zero difference between the effects of these covariates in 2003 versus prior years (the p-
  8value of the joint test that the differences in the non-ownership coefficients are all zero is 0.85).  
Thus, the only effect that has a differential effect in 2003 is executive share ownership, which is 
consistent with our tax-motivation hypothesis.  The lack of a significant difference on the 
executive options variable is particularly notable, because the implicit 100% tax on dividends 
faced by executives who own non-dividend protected options did not change with the change in 
the tax law.  This provides further reassurance that the observed correlations of interest are not 
being spuriously driven by some third factor that generally influences both executive 
compensation and payout policy. 
The results from the Probit are similar.  Executive stock option holdings, free cash flow, 
cash on hand, leverage, past returns, volatility, and firm market value are all significant 
predictors of firm payout behavior in general, but there is again no significant difference between 
2003 and prior years.  Owing to the non-linear fit of the Probit model, the magnitude of the 
marginal effects for many of the covariates are larger in absolute value than in the linear 
probability model, but as noted, our primary coefficient of interest (executive shares) is 
essentially unaffected.  The p-value of the joint test that the differences (i.e., 2003 relative to 
1993-2002 period) in the non-ownership coefficients are all zero is 0.53, with only the difference 
in the coefficient on market-to-book individually significant at the 10% level. 
To summarize, the results in table II are consistent with our hypothesis that dividend 
increases were motivated by executives’ personal financial incentives.  Executive share 
ownership is a significant determinant of dividend policy in 2003 but not in prior years, which is 
consistent with a change in tax rates in 2003.  Conversely, other determinants of dividend policy, 
while significant in all years, are generally not significantly different in 2003 versus prior years.  
This provides assurance that there were not other factors or events changing in 2003 that are 
spuriously driving the observed relation.  These results suggest that dividend policy was changed 
in 2003 in response to the fact that the fall in dividend taxes reduces the cost of paying dividends, 
and this effect is strongest in firms where the executives’ personal financial incentives are most 
affected by the tax cut.     
  9B.  Further Identification of the Executive Ownership Effect 
In order to provide further evidence that the executive ownership effect is due to the tax 
cut, we extend our analysis in two important ways in table III.  First, recognizing that the tax cut 
did not occur until late May 2003, we break 2003 into two shorter time periods representing the 
part of the year that fell before the tax cut and the part that fell after the tax cut.  In other words, 
rather than simply focusing on 2003 versus 2002 (or the prior decade), we can focus on: i) the 
pre-2003 period, ii) the portion of 2003 through May 23 (when the tax cut was formally passed 
by Congress), and iii) the portion of 2003 after May 23 (the period immediately after the tax cut 
was passed).  The CRSP data allow us to divide dividend increases into these sub-periods based 
on the announcement date, rather than the payable date, so that we can be sure of the relevant tax 
regime in place at the time the firm made its dividend decisions.      
Second, we distinguish between dividend increases that are dividend initiations among 
firms that did not pay dividends in the prior year and dividend increases among firms that were 
already paying dividends.  Among this latter group of firms that were already paying dividends, 
we can also look at firms increased dividends by a large amount, which we define as an increase 
in dividends per share of more than 25%. 
  These extensions are potentially important for determining causality.  For example, 
dividing 2003 into a period before and after the tax cut may provide insight as to whether the tax 
cut itself is the reason for the observed strong 2003 correlation between executive ownership and 
dividend policy.  If the observed correlation occurred mostly in the early part of the year, when 
ultimate passage of the tax cut was uncertain, one might be concerned that the observed 
correlation is not tax related.  Of course, as with any legislative event, there is uncertainty about 
the release of information during the period between the initial announcement and the final 
passage of the act, and thus how firms will react.  As noted earlier, the tax cut was unanticipated 
before January 2003, but then from January to May, the possibility of a dividend tax cut was in 
the news regularly.  While the ultimate passage of the tax bill was not a “sure thing” during this 
period, some firms may have made changes to their dividend policy in anticipation of the 
  10possible tax cut.  In particular, while it is highly unlikely that many firms would make a dramatic 
change in payouts, such as initiating a dividend program, solely in anticipation of a possible 
future tax cut, it is quite conceivable that a firm that was already paying dividends and already 
considering an increase, might go ahead and raise the dividend during the January to May period 
in anticipation of the tax cut.  If the latter were the case, and if executives with heavy stock 
ownership are more likely to push for the increase, then we might expect to see the correlation 
between ownership and dividend increases become more important even before the passage of 
the Act than in previous years.  Such an uptick in the correlation at the start of 2003 should be 
less likely for a dividend initiation, however, since the cost of being wrong about the tax cut 
would be greater (because the dollar amount of an average dividend initiation is typically much 
larger than the size of a dividend increase among prior dividend payers.)      
    The results, reported in table III, are consistent with these patterns.  Each coefficient 
reported in table III represents the marginal effect of the percent of shares held by top five 
executives on dividend increases from a separate linear probability model.
15  In each regression, 
we include all of the same control variables from table II, including the age and industry effects, 
but do not report the individual coefficients on those controls in the interest of brevity.
16   
[Insert table III here] 
The first row corresponds to the linear probability model from table II, where the 
dependent variable is defined as any dividend increase (including firms with and without a 
previous history of paying dividends).  In column 1, the coefficient of 6.3 on the probability of 
increasing dividends over 1993 to 2002 suggests that executive share ownership was 
uncorrelated with dividend increases in the decade prior to the tax cut (this is the same 6.3 
coefficient from column 2 in table II).  The second column in table III shows the result for 2002 
only, and the coefficient is again quite similar and insignificant, as expected.  In column 3, we 
see the highly significant coefficient of 54 on executive ownership for the year 2003, suggesting 
a strong effect of executive ownership on dividend increases (again, this is the same coefficient 
that we found in column 1 of table II).  In columns 4 and 5 of table III, we separate 2003 into 
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ownership and dividend increases is driven almost entirely by the post-tax cut period.  The 
coefficient in the pre-tax cut period is indeed higher than in prior years, consistent with the 
possibility that some firms may have increased dividends in anticipation of the tax cut, but the 
effect is not statistically different from zero.  In contrast, the coefficient for the post-tax cut 
period is 43.3, which is not only significantly different from zero, but also from the coefficient in 
prior years.  These results provide further evidence that the observed correlation is indeed a tax 
effect.   
How big is this executive ownership effect?  The actual fraction of firms increasing 
dividends in the portion of 2003 following the tax cut approval in May was 16.8%.  If one 
estimated a regression of dividend increases on the various explanatory variables during the 
same time period in 2002, and used the estimated coefficients to predict the post-May 2003 
dividend increases, one would have predicted that only 9.5% of firms would have increased 
dividends.  The difference, approximately 7.4%, represents the “unexpected” increase in 
dividend activity.  The change in the relation between dividend policy and executive ownership 
after the tax cut (relative to the same period in 2002) can explain 2.0 of this 7.4 percentage points, 
or about one-quarter of the overall effect.   
The results from row 1 of table III represent the combined effect of dividend initiations 
and dividend increases among firms already paying dividends.  As noted, however, there are 
reasons to suspect that firms already paying dividends might be willing to increase their dividend 
in anticipation of a possible tax cut, whereas firms are less likely to initiate a new dividend 
program for tax reasons until after the tax cut has become law.  This is because dividends are 
“sticky,” in that investors may expect dividends to be paid out regularly once started and rarely 
cut (Lintner (1956)).   
Turning to the second row of table III, we focus on the subset of firms that did not pay 
dividends in the prior year and examine how executive compensation affects initiations.  In the 
period prior to 2003, there is no discernable relation between executive compensation and 
  12dividend initiations, with an insignificant coefficient of 6.2 over the prior decade and –3.6 in 
2002.  In contrast, there is a strong relation in 2003, with a highly significant coefficient of 37.8.  
The coefficient of 37.8 indicates that moving from the 25
th percentile (0.3 percent) to the 75
th 
percentile (3.2 percent) of the fraction of shares held by the top executives raises the probability 
of a dividend initiation by 1.1 percentage points, while a one-standard-deviation increase in 
executive ownership translates into a 2.9 percentage point higher likelihood of a dividend 
initiation – both are economically large effects given the baseline initiation rate of 5.9% in 2003.  
An examination of columns 4 and 5 indicate that this correlation with initiations occurs entirely 
after the passage of the 2003 dividend tax cut.  This result is consistent with our hypothesis, as a 
firm is unlikely to initiate a new dividend program for tax reasons until they are quite confident 
in the passage of the act.   
As above, we can use the regression coefficients from the latter part of 2002 to predict 
the level of dividend initiations in the latter part of 2003 had the tax cut not occurred.  By 
comparing the predicted to the actual, we find an “extra” 3.8 percentage points of firms initiated 
dividends after the tax cut.  The change in the relation between dividend initiations and executive 
ownership after the tax cut (relative to the same period in 2002) can explain approximately half 
of this additional initiation activity (specifically, 1.8 percentage points of the 3.8 percentage 
point “unexpected” increase.) 
In row 3, we turn to dividend increases among firms that already have a prior history of 
paying dividends to shareholders.  While there is no significant relation between executive share 
ownership and dividend increases in the period before 2003, there is a highly significant 
coefficient (72.6) for the year 2003.  In contrast to initiations, where this effect was concentrated 
in the post-tax cut months, this effect is more evenly divided over the pre and post tax cut period.  
This is not entirely surprising given that firms that already pay dividends and that may be already 
considering increasing dividends further may be more willing to go ahead and increase dividends 
in anticipation of the tax cut, because of the cost of being wrong about the tax cut is lower than 
for an initiation.   
  13Because many firms with dividend programs follow a rather predictable pattern of 
slightly increasing dividends every year, it is also of interest to focus on “large” dividend 
increases.  We therefore examine whether executive ownership is correlated with the probability 
of increasing dividends by more than 25% over the prior year’s dividend level.
17  We observe a 
statistically significant relation between executive ownership in the pooled 1993 to 2002 data, 
although this effect is substantially and significantly smaller than in 2003, with a coefficient of 
only 12.9, versus the 64.9 that we observe in 2003.  Thus, the overall pattern is similar to that of 
any dividend increase among prior payers (i.e., including smaller increases), with a coefficient 
for 2003 that is significant and much higher than in prior years, but with the effect spread much 
more evenly over 2003 than initiations.   
Overall, these results indicate that the correlation between executive share ownership and 
dividend activity was uniquely strong in the year 2003.  Firms were loathe to start paying 
dividends for tax reasons until they had a high degree of confidence that the tax reduction would 
become law, and thus the executive ownership effect upon initiations is concentrated almost 
entirely in the period following the tax cut.  For dividend increases among firms that already pay 
dividends, the results suggest that many of the firms with high executive ownership increased 
dividends even prior to final passage, during the period in which the President and Republican 
members of Congress were moving the tax cut from initial proposal to final legislation.   
C.  Share and Option Ownership by Institutions and Other Individuals 
Our results provide evidence that the stock ownership of top executives has a significant 
effect on a firm’s decision of whether to increase dividends after the tax cut.  Of course, 
ownership by other groups could also have led to a differential response to the tax cut.  For 
example, a firm that is owned mostly by individual investors would benefit relatively more from 
the tax cut than a firm whose shares are owned primarily by pension funds, whose dividend 
income is not subject to tax.
18  Further, options held by non-executives, as well as those held by 
top executives, have been shown to influence payout policy (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989), 
Jolls (1998), Weisbenner (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002)).  However, since options 
  14are not dividend-protected, their effect on dividends should not vary with a change in dividend 
tax rates.  In light of this, we have tested whether these other stock and option holders influence 
dividend policy, and if so, whether the effect changed with the tax cut. 
In table IV, we re-estimate our primary specifications for the 2003 sample, as well as the 
difference in the relevant coefficient for 2003 relative to the pooled period 1993-2002.  However, 
this time we include additional controls for the fraction of shares held by individual investors 
other then the top five executives and the fraction of shares held by non-mutual fund institutional 
investors (primarily tax-exempt pension funds).  Like top executives, all individuals would face a 
higher after-tax return to dividends in 2003 than earlier years.  However, the share of the firm 
held by each of the non-executive individuals is less likely to represent a large part of their own 
personal wealth, and so the provision of liquidity is not nearly as an important an incentive for 
dividend payments as it is for top management.  The omitted category in this specification is 
mutual funds, which includes both taxable and tax-exempt accounts and which would potentially 
benefit more from the tax cut than non-mutual fund institutional investors.  
[Insert table IV here] 
The key finding from this specification is that even after controlling for individual and 
institutional ownership, the coefficient on executive ownership shares in 2003 relative to the 
prior decade (displayed in column 3 of table IV), is 47.4 and highly significant, and is little 
changed from the 47.7 in the specification without individual and institutional ownership 
(displayed in column 3 of table II).
19  Thus, while many of the other ownership variables are 
themselves significant, their inclusion does not alter the executive ownership effect, and, unlike 
executive stock holdings, their own effect on dividend policy does not change in 2003 with the 
tax cut. 
The effects of the other ownership variables are of some interest in their own right.  For 
example, we find a positive relation between the fraction of shares held by individuals and the 
likelihood of a dividend boost during 2003, which by itself is consistent with the tax motivations.  
However, in contrast to the results for executive ownership, the relation for non-executive 
  15individuals was no different in 2003 than it was for the prior decade when dividend tax rates 
were much higher.
20  Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) find that only 1/5 of chief 
financial officers report that the personal taxes shareholders pay are important when making 
dividend decisions.  Our results are consistent with this survey evidence—we find that firms with 
high individual ownership did not boost dividends in response to the 2003 tax cut, but those with 
high executive ownership did.  
In addition, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the fraction of shares held by 
non-mutual fund institutions, which presumably have more tax-exempt assets than mutual funds 
(the omitted category), throughout the 1993 to 2003 period.  The effect is not statistically 
different in 2003 than over the prior decade.  Of course, the dividend tax cut yields no direct 
increase in the after-tax value of dividends paid on shares held by tax-exempt institutions, and a 
pure tax story would suggest the opposite sign.  This finding, however, is consistent with the 
view that institutional investors such as pension funds serve as monitors of firms.  Pension funds, 
for example, are generally considered to be much more active monitors of corporations, whereas 
mutual funds are thought to “vote with their feet” and simply sell the shares of companies with 
poor governance mechanisms (Gillan and Starks (1998)).  With skepticism about the quality of 
corporate earnings in the post-Enron period, there was a growing perception that firms should be 
pressured to pay dividends, because cash distributions cannot be manipulated and make it easier 
for investors to verify the cash flows of the firm.  In addition, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
(2000) also argue that institutions may like the smoothness of regular dividends because it makes 
their task of rebalancing their portfolios more predictable and thus they increase their demand for 
dividends when its after-tax cost to other shareholders declines.      
In unreported results, we also find that options held by employees outside of the top 
senior ranks have a negative effect on dividend increases in 2003, but that the effect is about one-
third the magnitude of that for options held by the top executives. Similar to executive options, 
the effect of lower management options on dividend policy is not different in 2003 relative to 
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years.
21
In sum, the coefficients on the additional ownership variables and the option variables, 
both for upper management and lower level employees, suggest that they also influenced the 
likelihood of a dividend increase in 2003.  However, only the relation with executive stock 
ownership is larger in 2003 relative to the pre-tax cut period, indicating that the tax cut did not 
influence dividends through these other measures.  The inclusion of these other controls has very 
little influence on the executive holdings variables, suggesting that our executive holdings results 
are not being spuriously driven by the composition of the other owners of the firm. 
D.  Further Robustness Checks 
  In this section, we briefly discuss the large number of specification checks that we 
conducted.
22  The key point is that our primary finding – namely, that executive stock ownership 
strongly influenced payout policy following the 2003 dividend tax cut – is extremely robust. 
Using the CRSP definition of dividends allows us to determine the precise dividend 
announcement date and thus to sub-divide the 2003 period into pre- and post-tax cut periods.  
We have, however, also tested our hypothesis using annual dividends paid as measured in 
Compustat, which includes both ordinary dividends as well as special dividends.  In contrast to 
ordinary dividends, where the firm has the incentive to increase them only if they are confident 
that they continue to pay them in the future, special dividends are a one-time tool and do not 
necessarily signal a long-term increase in payouts.  Given the prominence of Microsoft’s 
announcement in July 2004 that they would pay a special dividend of $3 per share, totaling about 
$32 billion,
23 and the work of Blouin, Raedy, and Shackelford (2004) that finds a rise in special 
dividends after the tax cut, one might be interested in whether the results are significantly 
affected.  Using the Compustat measure of annual total dividends paid to construct dividend 
increases and initiations, we find that the results for 2003 are quite similar, with a highly 
significant coefficient on executive share ownership of 55.5 in the dividend increase regression 
and 38.1 in the initiation regression (the differences between these 2003 coefficients and those 
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significant).
24   
Baker and Hall (2004) argue that for many incentive problems, the dollar amount of 
management ownership is a more accurate measure of management’s incentives.  Thus, as a 
second specification check, we replace our dependent variable with the log of the dollar amount 
of shares held.  Returning to our CRSP definition of an increase in ordinary dividends, we find a 
coefficient on the natural log of the dollar value of shares held by top executive shares of 3.0, 
which is significant at the 1% level.  Of note, we find that the coefficient in 2003 is also greater 
than the coefficient in the 1993 to 2002 period, and that this difference of 1.8 is significant at the 
5% level.  Among dividend initiators, we find a similar effect, with a coefficient on the log of the 
dollar value of executive shares of 1.8, which is significantly different from both zero and from 
the coefficient in the 1993 to 2002 period at the 1% level (difference in coefficients is 1.7).      
Finally, we also break executive ownership into that held by the CEO and that held by 
other top executives to see if the holdings of the CEO are a bigger determinant of payout policy 
than those of the next four top executives in the firm (CEOs, on average, account for about one- 
half of the stock held by the firm’s top five executives at the end of 2002).  For both total 
dividend increases and dividend initiations, we find that both the share ownership of the CEO 
and that for the other top executives are important determinants of dividend policy in 2003. 
 
III.  Executive Holdings and the Dividend Substitution Hypothesis  
The 2003 Economic Report of the President, released in February of that year, provided 
the Bush administration’s economic rationale for the dividend tax cut.  In the analysis, the 
administration highlighted a number of reasons that a cut in dividend tax rates could have 
positive economic effects, including the elimination of distortions to investment decisions of 
firms, arguing that “the heavier tax burden on dividends can encourage investment in established 
businesses with internally generated earnings, because these businesses will tend to have more 
retained earnings because of the tax distortion.”  Implicit in this claim is that the dividend tax cut 
  18will increase dividends and result in higher total payouts, rather than cause firms to shift the type 
of payout towards dividends and away from share repurchases.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
find that firms with large repurchase programs also have a lower than expected dividend yield, 
indicating some substitutability between the two.  We, on the other hand, wish to test if the 
reverse is also true – do firms that increased dividends in response to the tax cut at the same time 
reduce share repurchases? 
In table V, we examine dividends and share repurchases paid during a given year by 
firms in our sample as reported in Compustat.  We define share repurchases as funds used to buy 
back shares, as reported on cash flow statements, consistent with other studies (e.g., Jagannathan, 
Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), and Grullon and Michaely (2002)).  For 
the subset of firms that increased/initiated dividends, as well as for firms that did not increase 
their dividend payouts, we report three statistics.  First, we report the likelihood the firm 
repurchased shares in the previous year and thus has a track record of distributing cash through 
other means.  Second, we report the likelihood that the firm decreased share repurchases 
(normalized by assets) conditional on having bought back stock in the prior year.  Third, we 
report the probability that the firm increased total payouts (dividend plus share repurchases, 
normalized by assets) relative to the prior year.  We do these calculations for three cohorts of 
dividend increasers, those that increased in the periods prior to the tax cut (1993 to 2002 and 
2002) and those that increased dividends in 2003.
25
[Insert table V here] 
The first row of table V reports results for all firms that increased dividends.  It indicates 
that the fraction of dividend increasers in 2003 that had previously repurchased shares (67%) was 
not significantly different from the prior decade (65%).  Just less than two-thirds of the firms that 
increased dividends in 2003 reduced their level of share repurchases (normalized by assets), 
which is slightly higher than in prior years.  The net result is that only about one-half (52%) of 
dividend increasers actually increased total payouts (normalized by assets).  This fraction is in 
line with prior years.
26   
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shown in the middle row of the upper panel, we find that among firms that initiated dividends in 
2003, 68% had repurchased shares in the previous year, significantly greater than the 38% in 
1993 to 2002.  Among these repurchasing-firms, 78% reduced their share repurchases from the 
previous year’s level upon initiating dividends in 2003, again significantly greater than the 56% 
in 1993 to 2002.  The net result is that 66% of all the firms that initiated dividends in 2003 
(including those that had not repurchased shares in 2002) also increased total payouts, with the 
remaining one-third actually cutting total payouts the year they started paying dividends.  As a 
benchmark, if no substitution had occurred, 100% of the firms that initiated dividends would 
have increased total payouts.
27  The contrast of the effect of a dividend initiation on total payouts 
for 2003 relative to previous years is striking.  During the previous decade (1993 to 2002), 89% 
of firms that initiated dividends increased total payouts.  In 2002, the figure was 92 percent.  
These rates are much closer to the 100% that we would expect if no substitution had occurred.  
These results are not driven by what may have been a lower inclination to repurchase shares in 
the early to mid-1990s, as the pattern of increased payouts upon a dividend initiation is also 
present when we focus only on the year 2002.  Thus, it appears that there are an additional 20 to 
25% of dividend initiators in 2003 than in prior years that failed to increase total payouts in the 
year they initiated dividends.   
Another possible reason that repurchases might have fallen in 2003 is that fewer stock 
options were being exercised that year, and thus the incentive to buy back is potentially lessened.  
To test this possibility, we show in row 3 of table V that payouts did not decline to the same 
degree for firms that did not increase dividends.  Specifically, the fraction of non-dividend 
increasers in 2003 that repurchased shares in the prior year (50%) was similar in 2003 as in prior 
years (44% for 1993 to 2002, and 51% in 2002).  Similarly, the fraction of firms that did not 
increase dividends in 2003 that experienced a decline in repurchases-to-assets in 2003 was quite 
similar to prior years (64% in 2003, versus 63% over prior decade and 58% in 2002).  As such, it 
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repurchases across all firms. 
To provide perspective on the size of the change in total payouts, the bottom panel of the 
table shows the distribution of changes in dividends, share repurchases, and total payouts (all 
normalized by assets) for firms that initiated dividends.  The normalized size of the dividend 
initiation is comparable for the pre-tax cut period (1993 to 2002) and the post-tax cut (2003), 
with no statistical difference in the mean or median.  However, the changes in both share 
repurchases and total payouts in 2003 are considerably lower than the changes in previous years.  
The mean change in share repurchases (normalized by assets) is –1.6 percentage points in 2003, 
leading to only a 0.6 percentage point increase in the payout-to-asset ratio, compared to an 
average of a 4.5 percentage point increase over the period 1993 to 2002.  Median changes in total 
payouts are also smaller in 2003, though not significantly different from earlier years.  Perhaps 
most telling is the negative change in payouts at the 25
th percentile in 2003 relative to the slight 
increase in payouts at the 25
th percentile from 1993 to 2002, owing to the more frequent cutback 
in share repurchases that occurred in 2003. 
Overall, these tabulations suggest some substitution from repurchases to dividends, at 
least among dividend initiators, prompted by the dividend tax cut.  The fact that there was no 
increase in total payouts among about one-third of dividend initiators might be somewhat 
surprising given that the tax burden of total payouts declined.  However, for firms that had relied 
more heavily on share repurchases to distribute excess cash flow (which was evidently the case 
for many of the dividend initiators in 2003), the reduction in the tax burden is actually somewhat 
small.  The tax rate on dividends was cut to the statutory rate on long-term capital gains (both 
were changed to 15%), but firms for which the previously higher tax burden of dividends was 
important likely had switched to share repurchases to exploit their tax advantage.  With an 
equalization of statutory rates, these firms became more willing to substitute towards dividends 
and scale back repurchases, leaving total payouts little changed. 
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among firms initiating dividend programs.  In table VI we more rigorously model the 
determinants of the broader payout policy choices firms made in response to the 2003 tax cut.  
As in the bottom panel of table V, we also focus here on the level of payouts, this time using a 
Tobit specification.  Having established that there is some substitution occurring, we are now 
interested in whether the executive-ownership-induced increase in dividends in 2003 translated 
directly into higher total payouts or was instead offset, leaving total payouts little changed. 
[Insert table VI here] 
We begin by running a Tobit specification where the dependent variable is equal to the 
increase in the amount of dividends paid (again normalized by assets), or zero for firms that did 
not increase dividends-to-assets, during the year 2003.  Column 1 reports the coefficients for the 
specification estimated on all firms.  Looking first at the non-ownership control variables in the 
Tobit model, the results indicate, not surprisingly, that free cash flow and cash on hand are 
positively related to the size of a dividend increase, while the executive option holdings, the 
market-to-book ratio, and volatility are negatively related to the amount of the increase.  This 
holds true both in 2003 and in unreported results for prior years.  Turning to the primary 
coefficient of interest, we see that greater executive ownership of shares leads to a larger amount 
of dividends.  Importantly, this effect is not only significantly different from zero, but it is also 
significantly different from the effect of executive ownership on the amount of dividend 
increases in the earlier decade.  Indeed, in unreported results, a Tobit model estimated over the 
pre-tax cut period yields a statistically insignificant, close to zero, effect of executive ownership. 
In column 2, we report a similar specification, but this time we replace the increase in 
dividends(-to-assets) with the increase in total payouts (dividends plus repurchases-to-assets) as 
the dependent variable.  We find that while greater executive share ownership translates into a 
higher level of dividends, it does not lead to greater total payouts.  These results suggest that 
firms with executive-ownership-induced dividend initiations in response to the 2003 tax cut often 
engaged in dividend substitution (i.e., often did not boost total payouts to shareholders as a result 
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cut period also yields a statistically insignificant, close to zero, effect of executive ownership on 
total payouts.  Thus, unlike the dividends result, the relation between executive holdings and 
total payouts do not seem to change in 2003. 
In columns 3 and 4, the exercise is repeated for those firms that did not previously pay 
dividends.  We find a highly significant positive relation between the executive share ownership 
variable and the amount of a dividend initiation.  This relation does not, however, exist for total 
payouts.  Again, this is evidence that those firms that initiated dividends due to executive 
ownership considerations did not always experience a comparable increase in total payouts.   
  These findings on dividend substitution complement prior studies that support 
substitution between dividends and share repurchases.  Grullon and Michaely (2002) find higher 
share repurchases by firms whose dividend increases are less than what would be predicted by a 
model of firm-level dividend changes, and Dittmar (2000) has similar findings based on an 
aggregate-level analysis.  Our study, which benefits from the exogenous change in the tax rate on 
dividends, provides evidence of payout substitution in the other direction.  Specifically, we find 
that shareholder taxes are a factor in the choice of payout mechanism and that when the tax rates 
are more closely aligned, firms exhibit some substitutability between the two (i.e., increasing 
dividends, at least in part, by reducing stock buybacks). 
 
IV.  Evidence from the Market Reaction to the Dividend Tax Cut Announcement 
We have shown that a firm’s ownership structure and the composition of its executive 
holdings influenced the change in payout policy following the dividend tax cut.  This raises the 
possibility that, to the extent that the financial markets anticipated these responses, one might 
expect a differential market response to the dividend tax cut based on these characteristics.  Here, 
we explore whether the market anticipated that at firms with large management stock holdings, 
the tax cut would lead to a substitution of dividends for tax-advantaged share repurchases, and 
thus perhaps raise the average tax burden on total distributions, at least for individual 
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contract for executives results in agency problems between executives and shareholders. 
As with any event study, the power of the test depends on how accurately one can 
identify the actual date on which the value-relevant information was released to the financial 
markets.  While an ideal event study has a very well defined event window, for legislative events 
the release of information is often spread out over a long legislative process, including, at 
minimum, an initial announcement of intent, committee hearings and votes, and votes by each 
house of Congress prior to final Presidential approval.  Despite the difficulties, there is a long 
history of research examining the effect of legislative events on stock prices.
28  The legislative 
process surrounding the 2003 dividend tax cut includes the possible release of information on 
multiple dates.  For purposes of this section, we focus on eight event windows, each consisting 
of five trading days (a +/-2 day window around each event).  These eight event windows are 
based on the careful analysis of news events between December 2002 and the May 2003 passage 
of the dividend tax cut conducted by Auerbach and Hassett (2005).  These eight event windows, 
combined spanning 40 trading days, are meant to capture the market reaction from the initial 
announcement of the tax cut proposal by the White House through the final passage of the tax 
cut in the House and Senate.
29   
The average stock return for our sample of firms, compounded over the eight event 
windows, is 9.9 percent, with a median of 6.4 percent.  Because a standard OLS regression of 
returns will be sensitive to outliers (some sample firms had extreme performance over these 40 
days as returns varied from a high of over 200% to a low of –44%), we estimate a robust 
regression and a median regression. 
Given that the dividend tax cut applied only to individual investors, we have two 
predictions for the stock price reaction of firms to the dividend tax cut.  First, returns should be 
higher for those firms with higher individual ownership (the group that gains from the reduction 
in individual tax rates) and that also have historically paid more.  This implies that the coefficient 
on the interaction of individual ownership and the prior year dividends-to-asset ratio should be 
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is more valuable for firms with higher levels of dividends (as opposed to share repurchases). 
Our second prediction is the most important for investigating the role of executive share 
ownership.  To the extent that the markets anticipated that some of the firms that initiated or 
increased dividends were more likely to reduce share repurchases (less likely to boost total 
payouts) in 2003 than in prior years, we would expect a negative coefficient on the interaction of 
the level of individual ownership and executive holdings.  As noted earlier, the overall tax 
burden for the individual shareholder may have increased because despite equal statutory rates, 
share repurchases are still tax-preferred because capital gains can be deferred.  The intuition is as 
follows:  if a firm has a higher level of individual ownership, which leads shareholders to care 
more about dividend taxes, and also has a higher level of executive ownership, which leads to a 
greater likelihood of dividend substitution and greater individual tax burden, then relative to 
other firms there should be a negative stock price reaction.  In a sense, this interaction of 
executive holdings with the share of individual ownership provides a way of quantifying the 
potential agency issues between management and shareholders.  If the tax cut induces executives 
with wealth tied up in company stock to boost or initiate dividend payments, even though the 
non-executive individual shareholders with far less concentrated portfolios would still prefer 
receipt of capital gains via earnings retention or stock buybacks to dividends even after the tax 
cut, this would be indicative of agency issues.  Thus, the more negative is the coefficient on this 
interaction term, the greater the agency costs. 
[Insert table VII here] 
As shown in table VII, the results are supportive of both hypotheses.  Consistent with the 
first hypothesis, we find that the interaction of a firm’s dividend-to-asset ratio in 2002 with the 
individual investors’ share of ownership is positive and significant.  It indicates that for a firm 
with a dividend yield of 2%, a one-standard-deviation increase in individual ownership 
corresponds to a 1.0 percentage point higher stock return during the eight tax-cut events.  These 
results are consistent with Perez-Gonzalez (2003) who finds that dividend valuation increased 
  25when dividends were less tax disadvantaged, but only for firms with large individual 
shareholders.   
We also find evidence supportive of our second hypothesis.  Specifically, the coefficient 
on the interaction of executive stock ownership with the individual ownership share is significant 
and negative.  We find that for firms primarily owned by institutions, the executives’ stock 
holdings do not influence how the market reacted to the tax cut (i.e., the executive ownership 
coefficient is small in magnitude and insignificant).  However, firms with higher individual 
ownership and high executive ownership actually declined in value.  Specifically, for a firm with 
the average level of individual ownership, a one-standard-deviation increase in executive 
ownership leads to a 1.7 percentage point lower return.
30  This is consistent with the view that 
the markets anticipated the potential agency conflicts between executives and other individual 
shareholders.  Further, this negative price reaction is suggestive that, at least for some firms, the 
compensation contract in place for top executives may not lead to optimal payout policy 
decisions from the shareholders’ perspective under a lower dividend-tax regime.  The right panel 
of table VII repeats these specifications using returns in excess of Fama-French benchmarks and 
the results are nearly identical. 
These results are suggestive of potential agency problems within some firms.  Ex post, 
we found that firms whose executives had large ownership shares were more apt to increase or 
initiate dividends, often by at least partial substitution with share repurchases.  Even after the tax 
cut, retained earnings and share repurchases, which distribute capital gains, are likely taxed 
somewhat less heavily than dividends since the gains are taxed on a realization basis.  Thus, at 
least in part, the market seems to have capitalized the likely payout-policy response by firms 
based on the incentives provided by executives’ share ownership.   
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
The 2003 tax cut provides a unique laboratory to test how a large reduction in the 
individual dividend tax rate influences corporate payout policy.  We provide evidence that top 
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that top executive holdings of company stock have a substantial impact on whether a firm 
increased or initiated dividends in response to the reduction in the tax-cost of paying dividends.   
Unlike past studies in this area that identify results from cross-sectional correlations, the 
unexpected and exogenous change in the after-tax value of dividends allows us to directly 
address the usual criticism that a cross-sectional relation between executive holdings and payout 
policy may simply reflect unobservable characteristics, such as managerial quality or corporate 
governance, that generate both option compensation and low dividends. 
We find that in 2003, especially in the months following the passage of the May tax cut, a 
firm was much more likely to increase dividends if the executives owned a larger fraction of the 
outstanding shares.  This correlation between executive ownership and payout policy is 
significantly different in 2003 than in prior years.  In contrast, while other factors, such as cash 
flow, leverage, past firm performance, executive stock option holdings, and institutional 
ownership are important determinants of dividend policy in general, their effect on dividend 
policy did not change in 2003.  Because only the effect of executive stock holdings changed 
significantly with the change in tax regime, we interpret this as strong evidence of a tax effect 
upon payout policy.     
Our work also indicates that, at least for dividend initiations, taxes are a factor in the 
choice of dividends versus share repurchases and that when tax rates are more closely aligned, 
firms exhibit some substitutability between the two.  We also provide evidence that the markets 
may have at least partially anticipated these effects, leading to differential stock price responses 
to key events leading up to the passage of the tax cut.   
This paper raises a particularly interesting avenue for future research.  The main finding 
of this paper is that personal financial incentives for executives clearly matter for firm payout 
behavior.  This finding is consistent with a standard agency theory perspective that, rather than 
operating the firm solely in the best interests of shareholders who may still prefer share 
repurchases or earnings retention to dividends even after the tax cut, managers are inclined to 
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particularly those concerning the stock price reaction to the tax cut, suggest there may be an 
agency problem between management and outside shareholders that should be considered when 
structuring management compensation contracts.  The relation between firm actions (e.g., payout 
policy, capital structure, investment decisions, etc.) and the incentives provided by executive 
holdings to undertake these actions, and whether the compensation package is structured a priori 
by the firm to encourage these reactions by managers remains an interesting area for further 
research. 
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  30Table I.  Summary Statistics for Dividend Policy, Stock and Option Holdings, and Firm 
Characteristics, S&P 1500 Sample 
The table provides summary statistics of changes in dividend policy during 2002 and 2003 for the firms in 
Execucomp (roughly the S&P 1500).  A dividend increase is defined as a rise in ordinary dividends per share 
(adjusted for stock splits), based on dividend announcements in CRSP.  The table also provides summary statistics, 
as of the end of 2002, on stock and option holdings of a firm’s top five executives and various firm financial 
characteristics.  Unless stated otherwise, variables are measured in percent. 




Dividend Policy (2002 and 2003)      
Probability Increase Dividends in 2003  28.7  0.0  0 .0 – 100 
Probability Increase Dividends in 2002  22.0  0.0  0.0 – 0.0 
Probability Initiate Dividends in 2003  5.9  0.0  0.0 – 0.0 
Probability Initiate Dividends in 2002  1.2  0.0  0.0 – 0.0 
Stock Holdings (end of 2002)      
Percent of Shares Held by Top Five 
Executives  3.8  0.8  0.3 – 3.2 
Value of Stock Held by Top Executives ($M) 142.1  11.7  3.3 – 40.0 
Other Variables (end of 2002)      
Options Held by Top Five Executives 
Normalized by Shares Outstanding   3.2  2.6  1.3 – 4.4 
Market-to-Book Ratio  1.6  1.3  1.1 – 1.8 
Free Cash Flow / Assets  6.3  7.1  2.5 – 11.9 
Cash on Hand / Assets  14.9  7.2  2.3 – 21.9 
Debt / Assets  24.0  22.4  6.1 – 36.0 
Five-Year Stock Return  -1.9  0.8  -10.0 – 9.3 
Monthly Stock Return Volatility   14.4  11.9  8.6 – 18.0  (past 24 months) 
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Firm Characteristics, Comparison of 2003 with Earlier Years 
 
The table presents linear model (the left panel) and Probit model (the right panel) regressions of 
whether a firm increases dividends in 2003 and in earlier years.  A dividend increase is defined 
as a rise in ordinary dividends per share (adjusted for stock splits) based on dividend 
announcements in CRSP.  The dependent variable is measured in percentage points, while the 
explanatory variables are expressed as raw ratios (i.e., not in percentage points), unless stated 
otherwise.  Thus, the dependent variable in this table takes on values of either 0 (did not increase 
dividends) or 100 (did increase dividends).  The likelihood of a dividend increase is related to the 
top five executive stock and options (both normalized by total firm shares outstanding) as well as 
the firm’s market-to-book ratio, free cash flow-to-assets (where free cash flow is defined as 
operating income before depreciation minus capital expenditures), cash on hand-to-assets, debt-
to-assets (where debt is long-term debt), past five-year stock return, monthly stock volatility 
(based on the past 24 months), log of market value, firm age indicator variables (1-5, 6-10, 11-
15, 16-20, and 21 or more years), and industry indicator variables.  The top five executive stock 
and option variables are obtained from Execucomp, the firm financial characteristics are 
obtained from Compustat, and the past five-year stock return and monthly stock volatility are 
obtained from CRSP.  The table presents regressions of whether a firm increases dividends in the 
2003 (leftmost column of each panel), the 1993-2002 period pooled (middle column of each 
panel), and the difference between the coefficients over the two time periods (rightmost column 
of each panel).  Specifically, a regression is estimated across the pooled sample 1993-2003, with 
an indicator variable for 2003 interacted with all the explanatory variables (interaction terms 
shown in far right column) to test whether the effect of a variable on the likelihood of a dividend 
increase is different in 2003 relative to earlier years (i.e., the period 1993-2002).  Marginal 
effects evaluated at the sample mean are presented for the Probit model.  The standard errors, 
given in parentheses, account for heteroskedasticity (i.e., robust standard errors), and, in the 
pooled regressions, correlation across observations of the same firm over time (i.e., clustering on 
firm). 
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Table II.  Regression of Likelihood of Dividend Increase on Executive Stock Holdings and 
Firm Characteristics, Comparison of 2003 with Earlier Years (continued) 
 
OLS  Marginal Effects from 
Probit Model 
 
  1993-2003  
Sample Pooled 
  1993-2003 
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p-value for joint test of significance 





***  0.00 
***  0.53
 
Firm Age and Industry Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2 0.203  0.219  0.262  0.247 
Number of Observations  1,356  12,618  1,356  12,618 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Table III.  Examination of Timing of Relation Between Executive Ownership and Dividend Increases and Initiations 
The table presents linear regressions of whether a firm increases dividends in 2003.  A dividend increase is defined as a rise in ordinary dividends per share 
(adjusted for stock splits) based on dividend announcements in CRSP.  These regressions are estimated over two pre-tax cut periods (1993-2002 pooled and 
2002), the full 2003 year, the portion of 2003 prior to the signing of the dividend tax cut on May 23, and the portion of 2003 after the tax cut was signed (after 
May 23).  The analysis is done separately for all firms (row 1), firms that did not pay dividends in the prior year and thus for whom a dividend increase 
represents an initiation (row 2), and firms that paid dividends in the prior year (rows 3 and 4).  The dependent variable is measured in percentage points, while 
the explanatory variables are expressed as raw ratios (i.e., not in percentage points), unless stated otherwise.  Thus, the dependent variable in this table takes on 
values of either 0 (did not increase dividends) or 100 (did increase dividends).  Only the coefficients on the stock holdings of the top five executives (normalized 
by total firm shares outstanding) are reported.  Other variables included in the regression, but not reported, are the stock options held by top executives, market-
to-book ratio, free cash flow-to-assets, cash on hand-to-assets, debt-to-assets, past five-year stock return, monthly stock volatility, log of market value, and firm 
age and industry indicator variables (as in the table II regressions).  The standard errors, given in parentheses, account for heteroskedasticity (i.e., robust standard 
errors), and, in the pooled regressions, correlation across observations of the same firm over time, i.e., clustering on firm. 
Pre-2003 Dividend Tax Cut  2003   
LHS Variable 
1993 - 2002 
(pooled)  2002 Full  Year 
Portion Prior   Portion After  
to Tax Cut   Tax Cut  
Signed May 23  Signed May 23 
***  ***  6.3 7.1 54.0 18.0 43.3       Probability Increase Dividends      (8.5) (12.0) (15.5) (12.1) (15.0)





**  **  37.8 1.3 37.1  
    (15.6) (4.2) (15.5)
Probability Increase Dividends 






***  *  72.6 40.6 49.0  
    (22.0) (25.3) (28.1)
Probability Increase Dividends by 
at least 25% given already pay 
dividends 
***  ***  *  12.9 -1.3 64.9 34.4 37.1    
      (5.1) (14.0) (22.7) (22.5) (22.5)
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table IV.  Relation Between Likelihood of Dividend Increases and Initiations and Holdings of Various Shareholders, 
Comparison of 2003 with Earlier Years 
The table presents linear regressions of whether a firm increases dividends in the 2003 (leftmost column of each panel), the 1993-2002 period pooled (middle 
column of each panel), and the difference between the coefficients over the two time periods (rightmost column of each panel).  Specifically, a regression is 
estimated across the pooled sample 1993-2003, with an indicator variable for 2003 interacted with all the explanatory variables (interaction terms shown in far 
right column) to test whether the effect of a variable on the likelihood of a dividend increase is different in 2003 relative to earlier years (i.e., the period 1993-
2002).  Regressions are estimated for all firms in the left panel and the subset of firms that did not pay dividends over the previous year in the right panel (for 
which an increase represents an initiation).  A dividend increase is defined as a rise in ordinary dividends per share (adjusted for stock splits) based on dividend 
announcements in CRSP.  The dependent variable is measured in percentage points, while the explanatory variables are expressed as raw ratios (i.e., not in 
percentage points), unless stated otherwise.  Thus, the dependent variable in this table takes on values of either 0 (did not increase dividends) or 100 (did increase 
dividends).  Relative to table II, these specifications add the fraction of shares held by individuals directly (outside of the top executives) and by non-mutual fund 
institutions.  Thus, in this case, the omitted category is the fraction of shares held by mutual funds.  The institutional ownership data is obtained from CDA 
Spectrum.  Individual ownership is defined as the fraction of shares that remains after accounting for executive and institutional ownership.  Only the coefficients 
on the stock holdings of the top five executives (normalized by total firm shares outstanding) and the ownership of non-executive individuals and non-mutual 
fund institutions are reported.  Other variables included in the regression, but not reported, are the stock options held by top executives, market-to-book ratio, free 
cash flow-to-assets, cash on hand-to-assets, debt-to-assets, past five-year stock return, monthly stock volatility, log of market value, and firm age and industry 
indicator variables (as in the table II regressions).  The standard errors, given in parentheses, account for heteroskedasticity (i.e., robust standard errors), and, in 
the pooled regressions, correlation across observations of the same firm over time (i.e., clustering on firm). 
  All Dividend Increases  Dividend Initiations 
1993-2003   1993-2003      Sample Pooled     Sample Pooled 
  1993-  2003 relative 
to 1993-2002
1993-  2003 relative 
to 1993-2002 2003  2002  2003  2002 









**  **    *  39.7 6.3 33.4
 
        (20.2) (18.4) (4.1) (18.7)
***  ***  Fraction of Shares Held By Individuals 










    3.0 0.9 2.1 
    (12.3) (1.8) (12.2)
***  ***  Fraction of Shares Held by  











      12.0 3.2 8.8
      (15.4) (2.9) (15.3)
Adjusted R
2 0.218  0.232  0.066  0.060 
Number of Observations  1,245  12,087  605  4,491 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table V.  Payout Substitution?  Change in Share Repurchases and Total Payouts for Various Firms 
The table summarizes payout policy for firms that increase dividends per share, previous non-dividend payers that initiate dividends, and firms that do not 
increase dividends.  Data on dividends and share repurchases paid (and thus total payouts) are obtained from Compustat.  The likelihood of a payout and the 









Repurchased Shares  
Last Year? 
Decrease Repurchases given 
Repurchased Last Year  
(i.e., RP/ASSET ↓)? 
Increase Total Payouts  
(i.e., PAY/ASSET ↑)? 
Sample  1993-
2002  2002 2003 1993-
2002  2002 2003 1993-
2002  2002 2003 
Firm Increases Dividends  
(All Firms)  65  71  67  55  60 64 56 53 52 
       Firm Initiates Dividends  38  54 68 56  57 78 89 92 66 
Firm Does Not Increase Div.  44  51 50 63 58 64 30 37  30 
 
 
  Payout Policy the Year of the Dividend Initiation  
 Dividend  /  Assets  Change in  
(Share Repurchase / Assets) 
Change in  
(Total Payouts / Assets) 
  Mean 25
th   Median 75
th   Mean  25
th   Median 75
th   Mean  25
th   Median 75
th  
1993-2002 Dividend Initiators  3.1  0.2  0.6 1.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.3  4.5 0.2 0.7 2.8 
2003  Dividend  Initiators  2.2 0.4 0.8 1.5 -1.6  -3.2  -0.1 0.2 0.6 -1.5 0.4 1.8 
 
 
Bold indicates statistic in earlier period (i.e., 2002 or 1993-2002) is different from comparable 2003 statistic at the 5% level.  
Table VI.  Amount of Increase in Dividends and Total Payouts in 2003, Tobit Model 
The table presents estimated coefficients from a Tobit model for both the amount of the increase in dividends and 
the amount of the increase in total payouts (dividends plus share repurchases), both normalized by total assets.  For 
firms whose dividends-to-assets or total payouts-to-assets fell, the amount of the increase is set to zero.  The left 
panel focuses on the full sample of firms, while the right panel focuses on the subsample of firms that did not pay 
dividends in 2002 (and hence an increase in dividends represents a dividend initiation).  Data on dividends and share 
repurchases (and hence total payouts) paid during the year are obtained from Compustat.  Regressions also include 
indicator variables for the age of the firm.  Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Tobit Model of Increase in Dividends/Assets   
  and Total Payouts/Assets in 2003    
 
All Firms  No Dividend in 2002 Firms  
  Max   Max   Increase in   Max   (Change in   (Change in     Div / Assets in 
2003 
(Change in   Total Payout / 
Assets, 0) 
Total Payout / 
Assets, 0)  Div / Assets, 0)






***  2.3    
 
  (2.4) (6.2) (4.3)
**  Options Held by Top Five Execs 





  13.2    
 
  (8.1) (26.4) (13.8)
*** 




***  -0.3    
 
  (0.3) (1.1) (0.6)
***  *** 







***  ***  15.4
 
    (10.2) (4.8)
***  *** 




***  3.3 
   
  (1.4) (3.8) (2.4)
**  0.2 -2.7 0.1   -8.1     Debt / Assets    (0.7) (1.2) (3.7)  (2.3)
-0.6 -1.6 -7.1   -3.8       Past Five-Year Return  (1.0) (1.5) (4.7)  (2.6)
***  ** 







***  **  -12.9
 
    (12.4) (6.4)




  1.5 
***  ***  0.9
 
    (0.6) (0.3)
Pseudo R
2 0.053  0.022  0.118  0.031 
Number of Observations  1,319  1,169  683  577 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table VII.  Cumulative Stock Return over Announcement of Dividend Tax Cut Proposal 
by White House, Introduction of Bill in Congress, and Final Package of Tax Cut—Relation 
with Dividend Payout Policy in 2002, Individual Ownership, and Executive Holdings 
The table reports regressions of the compounded stock returns over the eight event windows (40 trading days) 
surrounding the proposal and passage of the 2003 dividend tax cut upon the stock holdings of the top five executives 
(normalized by total firm shares outstanding), the stock options held by top executives (normalized by total firm 
shares outstanding), the share of individual ownership in the firm, and prior firm dividend policy.  We focus on eight 
event windows, each consisting of five trading days (a +/-2 day window around each event), that were first used by 
Auerbach and Hassett (2005).  We report robust regression and median regression results.  The left panel reports 
results using raw returns, while the right panel reports results using excess returns.  To calculate the excess returns 
over the 40 days, we subtract from the compounded raw returns over the eight event windows the appropriate Fama-
French (1992) benchmark returns, compounded over these eight event windows, formed according to two size and 
three book-to-market groupings.  Returns are expressed in percentage points.  Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. 
Dependent Variable =    
Cumulative Return Over the Eight Five-Day Windows    
Excess Return Relative to  











        Individual Investors’ 
Share of Ownership 
0.9 1.2 0.2 1.2
        (3.4) (3.7) (3.5) (3.7)








    -2.0 -6.1
    (7.7) (7.8)
(Executive Shares /   **  * 








**    -84.4 -52.7
    (36.1) (35.8)
Executive Options /   -0.3 5.4
Firm Shares  (21.7)
 
(23.2)
  -7.4 -10.2    
(21.9) (22.7)
(Executive Options / 
Firm Shares) *  6.0 -6.9
Individual Share  (62.4)
 
(66.8)
  -13.1 30.5    
(63.2) (66.1)
**  * 






*  *  -104.9 -109.3
    (61.0) (64.4)








*  *  266.8 259.6
    (154.7) (154.0)







    0.1 -0.3
    (1.1) (1.2)
Adjusted / Pseudo R
2  NA 0.007 NA 0.007 
Number of observations  1,477  1,477  1,477  1,477 
***, 
**, and 
* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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1 While Julio and Ikenberry (2005) have argued that the up-tick in dividend activity started before the 2003 tax cut, 
Chetty and Saez (2005) subsequently showed that this result was due to issues with sample construction, and that the 
tax cut was indeed responsible for an increase in dividend activity in 2003. 
2 The 2003 tax change also reduced the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income from 38.6% to 35%, and reduced 
the statutory long-term capital gains tax rate from 20% to 15%.  Repurchases still are tax-preferred because, though 
subject to the same rate as dividends, the tax is deferred until the capital gains are realized at the time the shares are 
sold (and may go untaxed through basis step-up at death).  However, this preference shrunk substantially with the 
dividend tax cut.      
3 While executives are not allowed to short their own company stock, Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) show that 
some executives hedge the idiosyncratic risk of their portfolios through collars and equity swaps.  Managers also 
could pre-commit to a regular pattern of stock sales to try to avoid sending a negative signal to the market when 
their stock is sold.  To the extent any of these diversification strategies occur will make it more difficult to find a 
relation between executive ownership and the likelihood of a dividend increase in 2003. 
4 The Nam, Wang and Zhang (2004) is much more limited in scope, in that it examines only S&P 1500 firms with 
ongoing dividend programs and thus misses the important effects of the tax cut on dividend initiations. 
5 Auerbach and Hassett (2005) and Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe (2005) find that high dividend-paying stocks 
earned excess returns of a few percentage points around the period of the tax cut.  Neither of these two studies, 
however, examined the firm-level variation in excess returns. 
6 In the regressions, the samples contain about 1,350 firms each year because roughly 350 firms are dropped each 
year due to missing values for some explanatory variables.  
7 We do not examine the previous dividend tax rate cut in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for three reasons.  First, we 
lack the extensive data on the stock ownership of top executives during this time period.  Second, this act included 
numerous other changes in the relative tax treatment of corporate and individual income that would make it difficult 
to isolate the effect of the dividend tax cut.  Third, the 1986 Act was the outcome of a much longer political and 
legislative process, making it less plausible that the 1986 tax cut was a surprise to the market.       
8 Auerbach and Hassett (2005) provide a very careful chronology of the events leading to the tax cut and confirm 
that there was very little, if any, information released prior to the announcement of the tax cut.   
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9 Unless stated otherwise, when referring to dividend increases we include both initiations as well as increases for 
prior dividend payers.  In table III we will analyze initiations as well as increases for prior dividend payers 
separately. 
10 Industry groups are as follows: mining, oil and gas, construction, food, basic materials, biotech/medical, 
manufacturing, transportation, telecom, utilities, retail/wholesale trade, financial, technology, and other. 
11 Throughout the tables, our dependent variable is measured in percentage points, while our explanatory variables 
are expressed as raw ratios (i.e., not in percentage points). 
12 The first year we can relate a change in dividend payouts to executive holdings at the prior year-end is 1993 
because the Execomp database starts in 1992. 
13 Note that, unlike the linear probability model, the marginal effects of 1993 to 2002 and 2003 separately need not 
add up to the marginal effect over the entire period 1993 to 2003.  This is because in a non-linear model, the 
marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means, which themselves differ slightly in the different time periods. 
14 The negative relation with cash on hand likely reflects that firms with greater needs to hold cash balances, because 
of higher transaction costs or precautionary demands (Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004)) are less likely to commit to paying or increasing dividends.  In addition, firms with greater debt ratios, and 
likely higher claims from interest expense on their earnings, are less likely to pay dividends as well.  Leverage may 
also substitute for dividends as a way to reduce agency problems (Jensen, 1986). 
15 As with the results of Table 2, the magnitude of the marginal effect of executive share ownership from a Probit 
model is nearly identical to that of the linear probability model. 
16 These coefficient estimates are available from the authors by request. 
17 While 53.5% of prior dividend payers increased ordinary dividends per share in 2003, only 13.8% increased them 
by more than 25% over their prior level.  For comparison, in 2002, while 43.3% of prior dividend payers increased 
dividends, only 5.5% increased them by more than 25% over their prior level.  Thus, most of the rise in dividend 
increases among dividend payers following the tax cut seems to be concentrated among the larger increases. 
18 While not all stocks held by individuals are in taxable accounts (e.g., some stocks are owned through tax deferred 
accounts such as IRAs), the fraction of direct stock ownership held in taxable accounts is higher than the fraction of 
mutual fund assets held in taxable accounts. 
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19 In contrast to the results from Table II where the omitted group was total non-executive ownership, here the 
omitted group is mutual funds.  As such, the coefficient on executive ownership during the pre tax cut period (1993 
to 2002) changes from 6.3 to 50.8.  What matters for our hypothesis, however, is that the difference in the executive 
ownership coefficient for 2003 versus earlier years is nearly identical in each specification. 
20 This ongoing demand for dividends by individuals is consistent with Shefrin and Statman (1984) who argue that 
individuals may prefer dividends despite their tax disadvantage because it helps them to solve a self-control problem.  
That is, by committing to consume only out of dividends, investors avoid deciding how many shares to sell and how 
much to consume, and thus commit themselves not to consume too much.   
21 Because total options outstanding, and hence the difference between total and top executive option holdings, had 
to be collected by hand, we collected these data for year-end 2001 and 2002, and related non-executive options, 
along with other variables, to dividend changes in the next year.  Thus, our comparison of 2003 with earlier years is 
limited to a comparison of 2003 with 2002 when this variable is included in the regression.  The coefficient on the 
variable non-executive options-to-total firm shares outstanding is significantly negative in both years (-36.4 in 2002 
and -50.7 in 2003), with the difference in coefficients statistically insignificant. 
22 In the interest of space, we do not report the coefficients from all the specification checks.  These results, and 
others, are available from the authors upon request. 
23 This large special dividend by Microsoft does not fall within our sample period. 
24 We also estimated a specification using another possible definition of a “dividend increase,” namely an increase in 
the amount of dividends paid relative to firm size (e.g., an increase in the dividends-to-assets ratio), and found 
similar results.  For example, the coefficient on executive share ownership is 44.8 in 2003, with a difference of 42.4 
between the 2003 coefficient and that from the pre-tax cut period 1993-2002. 
25 We report results for the Execucomp sample (roughly the S&P 1500).  An analysis of all firms in Compsutat 
yields qualitatively similar results. 
26 It is possible that an increase in dividends per share need not increase the dividends-to-assets ratio, and thus not 
increase total payouts.  To address this possibility, we also redefined a “dividend increase” as an increase in the 
amount of dividends paid relative to firm size (i.e., an increase in the dividends-to-assets ratio).  With this alternative 
definition, we find the following patterns in payout policy for those firms that boosted dividends-to-assets: (i) the 
fraction of dividend increasers in 2003 that had previously repurchased shares (62%) was identical to that of the 
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prior decade; (ii) among those that had repurchased shares in 2002, 65% reduced repurchases in 2003 while only 
53% did in the prior decade, a statistically significant difference; (iii) the net result is that 66% of dividend 
increasers actually increased total payouts in 2003, significantly less than the 73% over the prior pre-tax period.  
Note that for dividend initiations, the two measures of a “dividend increase” are identical. 
27 We also compared share repurchases and payouts during the year a firm increased dividends to the firm’s average 
level of dividends and share repurchases over the past three years (as opposed to just the prior year).  The results 
regarding dividend substitution are very similar.  For example, only 58% of dividend-initiators in 2003 increased 
total payouts above their average payout-to-assets ratio over the past three years (79% of dividend-initiators over the 
period 1993 to 2002 increased payouts relative to the prior three-year average). 
28 Some examples include the effect of the 1986 tax reform act (Cutler (1988)), financial services deregulation 
(James, 1983; Cornett and Tehranian, 1990), regulation of the market for corporate takeovers (Schumann (1988)), 
and the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (Brown, Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2004)). 
29 By using all eight event windows, we are taking the conservative approach in that we are biasing ourselves against 
finding a significant effect.  This is because a few of the 8 events have been shown by Auerbach and Hassett to be 
less informative to the market than the others.  By restricting ourselves to the more salient news days, our results are 
even more highly significant.   
30 However, the interaction of the individual ownership share with the amount of executive stock options had no 
effect on the market reaction to the tax cut (recall that the effect of dividends on stock option value did not change 
with the tax cut, thus whether the executives had a lot of stock options would not lead to a change in payout policy 
after the tax cut relative to earlier years, as confirmed in our earlier dividend policy regressions).      
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